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1.0
	 INTRODUCTION
J
Four years of experience, the most recent under the manage-
ment of the Urban Systems Project Office of Johnson Space Center,
have lead us to some conclusions about successful technology tran-
sfer.	 These are supported by the existing literature on the
management of innovation.
In the operation of an active technology transfer program,
- we have encountered and solved many problems:	 we have been un-
successful in solving even more. 	 The successes have provided a
firm basis for future successes, and the failures have had some
educational value.
	 This report puts forth the "enhancers of
technology transfer" (the success lessons) which can improve the
probability of success for current and future projects.
Contract orientation, the Technology Application Team (TATeam)
composition, and the client (NASA) have all changed significantly
.ul
over the years of this project.	 These adjustments have usually
improved things, but were never without some cost of adaptation.
A few organizational issues that have been effective are high-
lighted in this report and problems that have occurred are reviewed.
l
It is hoped that this report can form a basis for continuing
NASA-TATeam dialogue and will improve team performance for future
TATeams.
I
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mf{ 2.0 WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER?
For our purposes we should reconsider the definition of
^i	 technology transfer. One definition is:a.
}	 Technology transfer is the process of solving a social
or econom-.c problem through the application of an
existing technology -- one developed for a different
problem, in a different environment.
llli
This definition differentiates technology transfer from conven-
A
tional problem solution in one very important aspect. 	 Technology
transfer transfers a cost-effective solution from the sector in
which it was developed to the sector in which the need resides.
This implies that those actors in the needs sector are not opera-
tionally familiar with the technology that can solve the problem
in the most cost-effective way.	 This definition limits the cand-
idate activities that can be considered; however, it has been the
working definition of technology transfer for the Urban Develop-
ment Applications Project (UDAP) fcr the past four years.
=' This is not the only definition of technology transfer: a
h{ more universal definition is:
Technology transfer is the application of technology
to a new use or user.*
° e The important distinction rests in the types of activities that
are implied for a group whose mission is the transfer of NASA-
"t
developed technology to problems of urban construction and plan-
ning.
The first definition excludes dissemination activities that
have frequently baen characterized as "technology push" and
Gee, Sherman,	 The go-le of Technology Transfer in Innovation,"
L_^I
^f
Research Management, November, 1974.
2
focusses attention upon applying NASA-developed technologies in
critical problem areas where these technologies have not previously
been considered. This process of first characterizing the need
and then identifying candidate solution technologies is most
.^
	 frequently referred to as "market pull." The latter approach has
baen the focus of the UDAP project.
d
I^^
53.0 WHY ATTEMPT TO TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY?
Two reasons are readily available for an active technology
transfer program: the first is based upon the assumed validity
of the second:
• NASA's enabling legislation mandates technology
transfer.
I
• Technology transfer is complementary to conventional
research and development and car assure that the
benefits of new technology are realized at the earlifast
possible time.
The Mandate
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 included:
"The aeronautical and space activities of the United
States shall be conducted as aso to contribute... to
the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the
atmosphere and space. The AdminL tration shall provide
for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination
of information concerning its activities and the results
II thereof."L
The programs of the Technology Utilization Office, including the
Technology Application Team program, were created in response to
this mandate.*
A New Complement to Research and Development
Technology transfer is nothing new. The application of tools,
techniques and materials developed for one purpose to needs in
another context is as old as technological innovation itself. For
example, the technical expertise accumulated in the casting of
metals for armaments contributed eventually to the "invention" of
movable type and the advent of printing. In that case, the trans-
fer occurred naturally as the product of complex socio-economic
k"I	 An excellent summary of all of NASA's technology utilization pro-gram appears in Federal Technology Transfer by Todd Anuskiewicz,
published by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, August, 1973.
4
f
Icurrents and large measures of happy coincidence. However, the
time lag between the development of a technical capability and
its wide cultural application was very long--centuries, in fact.
Even in modern times, the spontaneous movement of technology
beyond the specific problem-solving application for which it was
created has often required more than a decade.*
The key to reducing these long time delays is believed to
be an accessible source of technology. The availability of the
technology an improve the rate of technological innovation.gY	 P	 g
Active programs, focussed upon particular areas of social concern,
can similarly influence the direction of innovative activity,
assuring that the potential of advanced technology is directed
at significant social problems.
Technology Transfer vs. Conventional Problem Solving
Most new technologies are the subject of great expectations
at the outset. For those areas where the technology is applic-
able a transfer usually occurs--eventually. The primary problem
with technology transfer "by accident" is that it takes a very
a, long time to match a need with an appropriate new technology.
The experience of technology transfer is graphically shown
in the accompanying series of graphs. Reviewing these graphs can
help our understanding of the important contribution that tech-
nology transfer can make to our problem-solving methodologies.
The top most graph (a) is a representation of the range of
technologies that can be applied to a problem as a function of
the flexibility of the problem statement. As an example, if we
describe a problem as:
See "Chronological Outline of the Development of the Mandrel-
Wrapped Fibre-Shell Concept for Housing," Quarterly Report #5,
.7	 Urban Development Applications Project, 31 March 1971.
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Technologies that can be
nnolied to solve the problem
P	 "Walls of exc.rvations must be restrained to prevent injury
1 and death of workers who must work in the excavation."
r	 Then we are constrained to technologies (from T - T ) that
restrain the excavation walls; shoring, soil stabilization, etc.
If, nowever, we state the problem as:
P "We must protect excavation workers from cave-in related
I'	 2 injury or death."
Then we can solve __,:e problem with technologies ranging from
T to T	 Note that all of the previous technologies are n-
c	 2
cluded, however, new technologies from T to T would include
1	 2
protective armor for the corker, emergency breathing apparatus,
and even automatic machinery to replace the worker in the danger
area.
Similarly we can describe the problem as:
P "Liquid waste must be disposed of without endangering
N excavation workers."
I
This allows the consideration of technologies that circumvent
the need to dig trenches for sewer construction.
It is clear that the problem statements differ significantly,
that the solutions to the earlier problems are also solutions
to the more general problem definitions. Let's now examine
the implications of this problem flexibility.
it
Graph (b) shows the form of the probability curve that indi-
cates where the solution is most apt to be found. The origin
represents the current technology, therefore, the probability
i
of a solution at that point is 1.* Solutions close to the cur-
rent solution (evolutionary changes) tre also highly probable.
The probability that a solution exists diminishes rapidly as we
II	 move to technologies increasingly distant from that current uti-
ui
There is a companion concept that problems can only be defined
r`	 in an evolutionary way. At least a poorly suited solution is
necessary to recognize and articulate the problem.
7
lized. This, along with considerations of available resources
is a strong determinant of the beh,-vior of industrial R61) organi-
zations.
The change in cost effectiveness of possible solutions is
represented in (c). The new solution may be less costly than the
conventional system, or it may be m(-,,- ,e effective, or both. The
NASA smoke detector will lower cost (from $ 50 to $ 5 or less)
4±	
and be more effective (false alarm rate will be 2 in 3 rather
than 9 in 10).
There are two possible interpretations of graph (c). The
first interpretation is that highly unusual approaches (from T2
E
to TN ) must of necessity be particularly cost effective in order
1
	 to succeed. The second interpretation is simply that the more
the technological content of the problem solution differs from
the conventional, the more effective it is. Historical evidence
I1
	 supports this latter conclusion, and this evidence is one of the
^-
compelling arguments in favor of a technology transfer experiment.
The time and cost of finding a solution to a problem both
it
II
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increase substantially as the technology applied differs from
current practice. This is indicated in the combined graph (d).
It is probable that the cost (and time) increase greatly as soon
as the technology does not fit current resources (human, produc-
tion, etc.), and varies little more as it becomea more unusual.
Considering these relationships we are lead to believe that
all arguments do not favor technology transfer. That is clearly
the case, otherwise technology transfer would be normal R&D be-
havior. The problems of cost and time coupled with the
8
I{Y
phiu
	ii	 probability curve (b) are the factors that have brought conven-
tional R&D to its current state. Evolution is efficient and
	
j_	 current practices are near optimal if a system has had a chance
to evolve. Changes in the system have occurred in :he past 10
!IV
	=.J	
years and processes of research have not yet adapted to them;
hence the opportunity exists to demonstrate technology transfer
as a more efficient means of solving society's problems.
The major system changes have been: the creation of large
scientific and technical data bases, and the growth of inter-
disciplinary firms like Abt Associates. The data bases and the
interdisciplinary teams facilitate time, cost and uncertainty
reduction in the search for and implementation of unf.-+.miliar
technologies.
It is important to note that the data bate is a mechanism
for identifying promising approaches to a problem. When a tech-
nological reference is found, we can locate the technology within
industry with a very few telephone calls (usually fewer than 5).
Applying that technolgoy to the new problem area will develop
and strengthen domestic capabilities.
The viability of a technology transfer process based upon
utilizing existing technology relies upon the quality, diversity.,
and accessibility of the available technology sources. When the
f utilization of federally-financed technology is a secondary
objective (secondary only to solving important social problems)
..I
then the mechanisms for accessing and applying this technology
	
I1U	
must be clearly delineated. The versatility and accessibility
g
dr^•
of technolgoy sources is an important con,id •-^ration and should
be carefully evaluated, since the cost/benefit of using the
various technolgoy sources has been found to be quite variable.
A primary concern is that altered organizational Ot.,',avior
and relationships have characterized successful technology
transfer projects. For many reasons the firms ,which operate
in the various markets are unwilling to innovate in those markets.
This behavior must be considered in the conduct technology trans-
fer. At present the change agent (TATeam) is a necessary par4 of
the technology transfer project, providing the linkages among
market needs, appropriate technologies, and producers/marketers.
i4
I^^q
I^
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4.0 HOW SHOULD ONE GO ABOUT TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY?
The important elements of active technology transfer
RII
'j
i
ll
	 li
tl
i
4
p:
11	 ii
include.
• Problem Identification
• Technology Search/Match
• Establishment of Market Mechanism
• Applications Engineering
• Commercialization
Our experience in each of these areas is substantiated by find-
ings of others who have examined the process of technological
innovation. In the following section ( 4.1) we discuss these
findings and in 4.2 we discuss their operational implications.
Section 4 . 3 discusses the management aspects of technology transfer.
4.1 Theoretical Modals
Although there are no comprehensive models of the processes
of invention or the diffusion of innovations, a great deal of re-
search has been done since a landmark 1967 Department of Commerce
Study.* In this section several of these perspectives will be
reviewed. They accurately reflect our experience, and are based
upon stronger evidence than the anecdotal evidence we can pre-
sent from our limited number of inno vation efforts.
g	 y`II
F ^
li	 l
*The problem of enhancing innovation in the private sec-
tor has !zing been a specific concern of DOC. In 1967, the
views of an advisory panel on invention and innovation were
presented in Technological Innovation: Its Environment and
Management, published by DOC. This panel of experienced tech-
nologists and entrepreneurs made specific policy recommenda-
tions which tended to be related to tax and patent regulation.
The strength of this study was that it served as a focus and a
forum for expert opinion. The weakness of this early study
was that it was not solidly grounded I.n empirical data.
11
r4.1.1	 The Six Stages of InnovatiD.-, Model
This model was first proposed by Donald Marqu-'s in the
"Anatomy of Successful Innovations," Sloan School Working Paper,
MIT, Cambridge (undated).
	
Marquis introduced it to explain the
process of invention discovered in an NSF study of over 400 inno-
JrI D
vations	 (NSF 69-71,
	 1,969).	 His model is displayed as Figure 2.
The innovation process consists of the six stages:	 recognition,
iy
idea formulatic-., problem solving, solution, utilization (pre-
commercial), and diffusion (commercial). 	 At any point in time,
there exists a current state of the art, or inventory of feasible
technical approaches.	 This technology inventory is represented
by the top arrow in Figure 2.	 Similarly, there exists a number
of potential users who are applying products to applications.
Marquis calls this the current state of social and economic
utilization (bottom arrow in Figure 2). 	 The innovator is more
or less aware of the current state of social and economic
utilization.	 The process of innovation begins with the recog-
nition of match between a feasible technical approach and an
unmet user need.	 This match or fusion into a design concept
is the seconq or idea stage.	 This idea formulation is a crea-
II process in which both elements must be balanced. 	 If tech-
nical possibility alone is considered it may result in an inno-
Lj vation for which there is no demand.
During the problem solving stage, the innovator establishes
the market feasibility I,,- accessing the current state of eco-
nomic and social utilization and establishe8 the technical
feasibility by searching the (.urgent state of technical
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Source: Donald Marquis, "The Anatomy of Successful Innovations"
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knowledge.	 Clearly, thi3 process involves risk and uncer-
tainty; moreover simply to evaluate alternatives consumes re-
sources.
	 This tech,iology selection process inherently pro-
ceeds capital investment decisions.
The conventional wisdom is that innovation proceeds along
a chain of idea development:
	 research M -o-development (D)-►
engineering (E)-.marketing (M).*
	 In related work we suggest
^^. that the process is reversed in most cases of successful tech-
nical innovations.	 Engineering is done only in response to a
till demonstrated demand in the market, development is undertaken
11 only when the attempt at engineering identifies an unmet tech-
nical need; and research is initiated only if that development
(^I
L effort should require it.
	 This is also the view of Tames
Utterback, who says that new alternatives will be sought only
when present alternatives do not meet expectations.**
	 If this
is true, Utterback argues, then information which directs atten-
tion toward expectations will be effective in stimulating tech-
nology transfer (active or passive).
jH
Several of the policy-relevant hypotheses that lead from
the innovation process model outlined above (e.g., "Innovation
is encouraged by financing the search for alternatives"), will
occur again in connection with the communications process model
to be discussed in the next section.
4
I
i^
s. f
*Design of an Ex erimental Pro ram of Transfer Technolo
to and it in anada,	 9 3
	 t ssociates, Cambridge.
l^TI;ID 	 **"The Process of Innovation: A Study of the Origination
and Development of New Ideas for New Scientific Instruments,"
;'	 IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, EM-19:4, p. 121,
Nov. 1971.
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4.1.2 The Communication Process Model
This is a view of the innovation process most extensively
studied by Thomas Allen of MIT. He fines that there is a
communications process that keeps the innovator informed about
the current state of technical knowledge. In this communica-
tion process, internal channels are more effective than exter-
nal ones and person to person communications is more effective
than journals and other printed matter.
We hypothesize that the benefit of gathering information
is primarily in reducing the risk of unknown contingencies in-
herent in adopting untested equipment, processes, or procedures.
For this reason, prior NASA experiences that evidence improved
technology and are visible to others should reduce the risk
and increase the rate of adoption. This is echoed by Rogers
and Shoemaker, whose characterization of innovation is dis-
cussed in the next section.*
These definitions serve as a starting point because so
many other studies have been (and will be) expressed in these
terms. Although they are useful to the innovation theorist,
they are clearly too general and broad to aid operational pro-
grams in determining the degree to which a given policy will
enhance technological innovation.
Some researchers have disaggregated relative advantage
into the following components: (1) functional utility,
*Communication of Innovations, Free Press, New York, 1971
^^ 4	
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ii (2) ease of use, ( 3) acquisition cost, (4) operating cast,
liI
(5) reliab4.1ity, and (6) compatibility. One nearly universal
it	 conclusion of recent work on innovation is that stated by
If	 Achilladelis, et al:*
Successful innovators have a much better under-
standing of user needs. They may acquire this
N	 superiority in a variety of different ways. Some
may collaborate intimately with potential custo-
mers; others may do market research or themselves
l have the necessary experience of user require-
ments. But however acquired, this imaginative
understanding is the hallmark of success.
I^V	 This conclusion is echoed by Marquis and Myers, in their NSF
study of over 400 innovations, and summarized by James Utter-
ed
back.**
Sensitivity to user needs is the single most important
concept that must be incorporated into an active technology
transfer program, and it is the central theme of all TATeam
activity.
4.1.3 Behavior of Industrial Organizations
Given the well-documented desire of almost all industries
II:.
to enter new markets, to innovate, to increase profitability,
q'	 to increase their market share and to diversity, it would seem
r,
an everyday task to identify an appropriate producer for a
4-	 given commercial innovation. This is not the case. Most ex-
perience in this area indicates that great difficulty is en-
countered when an external advocate attempts to encourage an
r-^
*Achilladelis, B., Jervis, P. and Robertson, A.: Success
I	 and Failure in Industriial Innovation: Report on Projectt SA FHO,
Centre for the Study n ^'^u5' tr al Innovation, London, 1971.
**Utterback, Jam<ss, "innovation in Industry and the Diffu-
^^	 s:on of T,,:chnn'ogy,'`' S^ itaC^, ] :i., Y, 620 3 "rbruar , 13, 1974.
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innovation. There are many reasons why innovation does not
progress in the straightforward manner that seems appropriate.
I
It is the first response of anyone desiring an innovation
to go to the current supplier of a related product or to a
supplier who has been providing a solution to that or similar
problems in the past. For many reasons, this is an inappro-
priate vendor selection. In Donald S),one's Technology and
Change it is argued that innovation occurs when one industry
invades the market of another industry. There are many reasons
why this is the case. Among the most important are:
o Capital Obsolescence;
• Unfamiliar Technology;
^r
• Economics of the Proposed Innovation;
• Social and Personal Uncertainty.
Each of these will be discussed briefly and an approach
to innovation procurement will be presented.
Capital obsolescence is a component of the other considera-
tions which follow, but is of sufficient importance to describe
it individually. Capital obsolescence includes not only plant
it
and equipment, but also includes human capital. An organiza-
tion that can avoid capital expenditures by not innovating has
ilk
a tendency to avoid these expenditures. Replacing a current
I,JI	 product with a new product, particularly a new product based
1NN
	 entirely on a different technology, almost invariably involves
Iil	 the obsolescence of existing production capital.
+ill
	 Unfamiliar technology is widely believed to be an addi-
tional reason why a firm does not innovate in its own market
{_u
17
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area.	 A primary reason cited is that management, familiar
with current technology, is threatened with technical obso-
lescence and fears loss of control.	 There are many suggestions
that more effective innovations rely on newer technologies,
I;	 !I
far removed from existing practice. 	 For this reason, firms
+II	are hesitant to innovate.	 t
Computations of return on investment yield lower figures
,.	
when it is a question of replacing a current product line,
r
I ,	 current plant equipment, current sales techniques and even
sales literature, than the yield when starting a new product
l
j!	 that does not compete with an established product line.	 As
an example consider that the current product returns a unit
II profit cf $1.00.	 If the new product requires all new capital
equipment and the new product yields $2.00 unit profits, then
the capital expenditure represents only a $1.00 per unit pro-
fit opportunity to the manufacturer of the current product,{!r
but the same investment represents a $2.00 unit profit to
II	 „'
!!	 a manufacturer that isn't obsoleting a current product.	 These
--	 economic considerations make innovative products mrre attract-
ive to firms without vested interests.
'1'	 Finally, social uncertainty may contribute to the lack of
it	
lj
4 innovative activity of some organizations. 	 When an organiza-
tion does move into an innovation, a social transformation fre-
quently accompanies the change. 	 Something old must come apart
II	 in order for something new to come together. 	 But for individuals
7
within the system there is no clear grasp of the next stable
I state, only a clear picture of the one that is to he lost.
18
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Hence, the coming apart carries uncertainty and anguish with
it for the members of the organization, since it puts at risk
the basis for self-identity that the system had provided. It
does not matter that the change may later be seen to have been
harmless or even beneficial; before the fact the threat of dis-
ruption plunges individuals into a state of uncertainty as
intolerable as damage to vested interests. The individual puts
his own conservative energies at the service of the system
conservation and not at the servi-,e of the innovation.
An over simplified first response to the problem of a
threat is to ignore it.* This response is very nearly universal.
A stranger to an organization can usually notice things the
organization has kept hidden from itself; this fact makes con-
sulting possible. When it is no longer possible to avoid
noticing a threat it may be possible to launch a counter attack
or even a preventive attack before the threat has materialized.
Such an approach is frequently encountered, e.g., in building
codes or trade union practices when innovations are first
recognized.
When the threat car-nt be displaced the strategy of con-
tainment and isolation is frequently developed. The threaten-
ing change is limited in scope and kept effectively bottled up.
This constraining activity usually results in the innovation
withering and dying. A variation of this is co-option, or the
absorption of the change to diffuse it, dilute it or turn it
*This discussion of organizational response is adapted
from Donald Schon's discussion of "Dynamic Conservatism" in
his recent book, Beyond the Stable State.
19
II	 to other ends.
Finally, changes can be dealt with by accepting them
but limiting them as much as possible. It is probable that
this behavior is only present when the threats to the individual
or to the organization characterized above are present. We
A 1	 can develop a strategy for matching the user and the need
with an appropriate commercializing organization to minimize
the probability that these pitfalls materialize and to maximize
l
the probability that a cost-effective solution will be developed.
It is very important that dysfunctional behavior be recognized
early because all transfer activities can encounter these bar-
riers and be contained within a firm with a vested interest to
protect.
u
4.2 0 erat .onal Implications
The studies that have been performed on the process of tech-
nological innovation provide guidance for the establishment of
r	 policies that maximize the probability of success in an opera-
tional program to facilitate the widespread application of
r,y
advanced technology. Individual cases of successful innovation
also provide "how-to" patterns for future efforts. On the
other hand, studies of failures and barriers, only show one or
Ip
a few of hundreds of ways to avoid success (achieve failure?).
In addition it is possible that a given barrier might not stop
a different innovator, therefore we can't even be sure that a
past approach that failed is inappropriate for future efforts.
'	 We conclude that the elements of successful attempts warrant
our attention, and that these "enhancers of innovation" will,
I	 20
if properly attended to, provide future successee.*
4.2.1 TATeam Orientation
"The great promise of technology transfer _`es in
its systematization and organization on a national scale.
However, the realization of this promise remains elusive,
principally because of the innumerable technological,
political, economic, social, and behavioral factors which
affect the outcome. As concluded by Burns, 'The mechan-
ism for technology transfer is one of agents, not agencies'.
That is, effective communications and interpersonal rela-
tionships are the most important factors contributing to
successful technology transfer. But social scientists
have yet to devise a way by which these principles can be
practiced in a systematic or organized fashion. Further-
more, the human ego is notoriously resistant to manage-
ment and control."**
• Orientation should be to solving problems, riot ful-
filling contractual obligations, these are necessary
but secondary.
*It must be remembered at all times that success is the
rarity:
• For example ,_ 	DRI semiannual report, 1 Jan. 1974 -
!	 30 June 1974, Contract NASW-2607.
• For problem benefit information perhaps 1 of 10 contacts
yields useful information.
• In searching technology, 100 computer references re-
sult in 10 interesting abstracts, 5 relevant technical
reports, and one cooperative technologist.
• Perhaps one in five promising technical approaches
can confcrm to a given problem's constraints.
• One marketable product results from 3 to 5 prototype
developments.
• One out of five of the pest selected commercial firms
p'	 is willing to participate.
II^
• etc.
h	 **Sherman Gee in Research Management, November, 1974
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i• Technology transfer agents should always approach a
transfer with optimism and persistence, expecting to
encounter many near defeats, impasses, and delays. If
the first failure stops an effort, then all efforts
will fall short of completion. The TT agent must ex-
pect to encounter and circumvent barriers, not be
stopped by them.
• An open, investigative attitude must be maintained.
It is an overwhelming temptation (especially to highly
technical agents) to prejudge the technology that is
;i! most effective" or "most appropriate" for a given
problem. Effective problem solutions result from
searching the broad range of potentially relevant tech-
nologies: preconceptions interfere with objective
u
search.
` 
a
'	 • Advocacy is important. A technology transfer agent
responsible for a problem must be committed to its
I!'	 solution and believe in the chosen technical approach.
• Communication, both internally (TATeam, NASA, problem
specifier, commercializer, etc.) and externally are
very important. Frequent internal contacts enhance
mutual understanding of needs, specifications and tech-
nological opportunities. External communication maxi-
mizes the chance of "fortunate coincidences" that are
U
j	 so frequently part of the innovation process.*
*0ne or more chance happenings are key elements of almost
all successful innovations.
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• Knowledge of the problem area is very important. The
transfer agent should have knowledge not only of the
technical aspects of users problems, but should fully
understand the environment of the problem -- organiza-
tions, vested interests, political power, other dominant
influences on potential users of TT results.
4.2.2 Problem Identification
The understanding of the problem has decisive importance.
Many of our operational hypotheses are concerned with this step
in the process, good problem sources, characteristict, of appro-
priate problems, means of communication, and operational treat-
ment of individual problems:
• De irable characteristics of problem specifiers include:
- ability to implement a solution;
- willingness to participate in solution development;
- constitute a market for the solution (or have access
or impact upon market).
• Government agencies whose mission includes Urban Con-
struction and Safety are good problem specifiers.
- Agency RED priorities;
- Individuals within the ^;;encies.
• Large users, and user groups have been effective as
problem specifiers.
• Professional journals and industry publications are
sources for initial problem identification.
• Appropriate problems are persistent, technology trans-
fer takes time. "One Shot" problems such as glass
23
breakage in a single high-rise building are usually
inappropriate.
,w	 Problems should be pri.mar.'ly technological. 	 An educational
l television system has high technological content, but suc-
cess depends upon the associated social system. 	 Improved
smoke detection faces no similar uncertainty.
•	 Problems should be specific.	 A generalized problem
definition usually results in a solution that io
sub-optimal for each user (e.g., early efforts for police/
fireman short-range communicator). 	 It is preferable to
1
develop a prototype well suited to one large user and
let it be modified to broaden its market. 	 This assures
maximum cost effectiveness of initial products.
•	 High social benefit should accrue to the solution of
problems chosen for TT efforts. 	 This is important to
facilitate the rate of adoption of a solution as well
as to justify expenditures of federal funds.
•	 A tool is needed to facilitate communication. 	 The
Clingman Guidelines* prepared for NASA is a good basis:
- to communicate problem-relevant information;
- to motivate the reader to take action.
•	 Problem statements are frequently rewritten to fit the
II1	 I
communication and motivation needs of successive stages
of the transfer process.	 Problem statements serve to:
- Communicate to technologists in the search for
solutions;
a^
P - !	 *W.H. Clingman E Co. under contract No. NASW-1995, January
(II	 121 1970.
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- Communicate to potential users of solutions to
improve problem specifications, delineate constraints
on solutions, and establish the benefits;
- Invite commercial participation.
The problem statement is altered frequently as its
function varies.
• Each problem is cycled rapidly through the full circle
of problem-----+ appropriate technology—} benefit-----
solution.
- The first cycle may be in the head of a TATeam mem-
ber to see if it makes sense as a TT activity;
- The second cycle may be a discussion among users and
technologists;
- Subsequent cycles occur as viable technical approaches
are considered.
Each cycle may change the orientation of the problem;
a given technology may solve only a subset of the
original problem or may have implications far beyond it.
The purpose of the complete cycle (even if it is only
conceptual) is to be sure that it is possible to achieve
an end result before incurring significant expenditures.
4.2.3 Technology Search and Match
The broad range of potentially applicable technologies must
be considered, the most promising must be investigated, and
effective steps must be taken to implement promising solutions.
• Brainstorming is an approach that identifies the range
of potential technical approaches.
• Database searches establish the work that NASA has "Jne
in each technical area.
j	 illj
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• Dissemination of problem statements allows informal
information channels to consider the problem.
• Literature reviews serve to identify those technolo-
gies where NASA has made or can make unique substan-
tive contributions.
• While personal contact is most effective, the goal
must be cost-effectiveness. Therefore, written com-
munication, problem statement dissemination, profes-
sional publications and conferences, and telephone
stages of problem solution, and personal contact is
used when the actual technology application commences.
• Prioritizing technical approaches in unnecessary. It
is natural to have starts and stops on each approach,
with a final determination resulting from that approach
that goes to completion first.
• Access to technologists can best be achieved by tele-
phone search. Rarely is it necessary to make more than
four telephone contacts to find the most qualified NASA
technologist(s) in a given discipline. This process is
greatly facilitated by recognition of the various "gate-
keepers" at the centers.
• Formal procedures must be observed, both with technical
and administrative management.
• Technologists self-select. If they aren't motivated,
their contribution would be minimal. Opportunity for
technical achievement is a significant motivation as
are organizational rewards.
26
• In many instances we find that the technologist has
1	 `
some prior appreciation of the problem, many have al-
ready roilized the applicability of his knowledge, and
welcomes a mechanism to contribute to the problem's
i
solution.
V;	 p
k	 Ii 	II
9
f
E
; v •	 ^	 ^iIIa.	
L9
F
h
Ui
r.
27
I'
r
Ik
4.2.4 Establishment of Market Mechanism
The market mechanism is the process by which an innovation
}d' i	 can be introduced. If an innovation is a direct replacement
for a higher cost item, the the market mechanism is straight-
forward. Safety is a typical. attribute that has no obvious
market mechanism. Consider a "safer" bathtub: the builder
isn't the user and doesn't perceive that a safe bathtub will
enhance his marketing, therefore the manufacturer of tubs won't
offer such a tub even though enough hom_, -wners to make an
U
attractive market segment would gladly pay the additional
cost of safety ( especially the elderly, parents of infants.)
• The market mechanism should be determined prior to
significant development effort.
• Conventional direct mechanisms are best (lower cost,
or at least cost-effectiveness).
• It is necessary to identify actors responsive to the
li+
problem solution throughout conventional marketing
``,,	 channels, users, retailers, wholesalers, and suppliers,
i or a market mechanism will be elusive.
• Aggregated markets or large single purchasers are ex-
cellent for initial marketing.
4.2.5 Applications Engineering (A/E)
It is very unusual that a technology can be transferred
without adaptation. A means must be provided to assure that
appropriate applications engineering occurs.
• NASA is willing in many instances to fund efforts to
demonstrate technical feasibility. This practice should
28
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be continued.	 l
•	 The TATeam should actively promote TU activities as
attractive RTOP opportunities among technologists.
•	 Indus;:ry can be involved in many aspects of A/E activity:
- under contract;
' - under license;
u	 i
- in cooperative effort.
•	 NASA technologists should be made available to industry.
4.2.6	 Commercialization
Va
Because there is often a threat to vested interests, and
i
because entrenched industries may effectively discourage an
important innovation, there are desirable characteristics of
industrial participants in Technology Transfer.
•	 The product shouldn't replace a current product in the
firm's line;
°'	 •	 The commercializing firm should understand both the
technology and the market.
^!,A	 •	 Established marketing channels are preferred.
•	 Financial strength is important, consider not only the
development cost, but also the demonstration, production
and marketing investments.
•	 Some degree of proprietary treatment, patent or license
1: II j	 protection is usually required to interest a manufacturer.
•	 Advocacy of all departments ank' at all levels, upper
management to operating management, marketing and in
f ^	 R&D is important and should be encouraged by providing
decision relevant information as appropriate.
^''	
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4.3 Management of Technology Transfer
Perhaps the greatest variety among the current NASA TATeams
is evidenced by the management approach that each uses. Making
our approach explicit allows comparison. The "technology trans-
fer" activities associated with team operation include:
• Management and other non-mission activities
(reports, briefings, publicity, etc.);
• Problem Identification;
• Technology search/match;
• Market Research and Economic Evaluations;
• Management of Innovation (by project).
We estimate that economies of scale are possible in this opera-
tion.* The fixed price is estimated at roughly $100,000 to
$120,000 per year, and the marginal cost per transfer project is
on the order of $20,000 to $50,000. The minimum efficient scale
of operation is approximately $250,000 per year. A program,
with continuity can be expected to result in 7 to 4 completed
transfers yearly.** The many disruptions, re-directions, and
organizational changes that have occairred have reduced the
effectiveness of any of the operating approaches that have been
attempted. The cost to the TATeam of new government technical
representatives, of adapting to new organizational relationships,
r
and of changed and broadened missions has not been negligible.
From this experience of yearly reductions in level of effort,
accompanied by transient operating requirements we have developed
Hl hi	 a highly adaptive management styli:.
See Dr. R.N. Foster s, Organize for Technology Transfer,"
'(!	 Harvard Business Review, Nov.-Dec., 1971, Page 118.
9	
**This is a steady state condition. There is a delay of two to
three years while the pipeline fills.
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The operating hypotheses that we pursue are intended to
achieve maximum leverage of the TATeam efforts. This is achieved
4^1
with significant sacrifices in Time and Control.
• Schedul, and monitor transfer projects.
• Schedule and perform the contractual obligations
(reporting, briefings, etc.).
• Define and structure problems as a "background"
or "fill-in" activity.
• Search for technology as a "fill-in" activity as
other scheduled activities permit.
• Maintain constant level of effort with over 50%
commitment of each team member.
• Use NASA elements of program for technology search.
• Externalize the advocacy role to both users and
jcommercializers.
• Determine decision criteria of key actors and develop
only the informat'on required for those decisions.
(This is far different from the past rigid process
of state-of-art surveys, market studies, competitive
market analyses, brainstorming, thorough technology
searches, etc.)
• Maintain frequent contact with all actors so that
communication channels remain open-
• Provide technical assistance to a broad range of
potential users to assure that operation will be
available when it is needed.
• As with most activities, time pressure enhances
efficiency, this implies that if we attempt slightly
more than can be accomplished, we will achieve more
efficient operation than if we set our goals, object-
ives and operational plans at lower, easily achievable
levels.	 It also implies slipped schedules and some
"falling between the cracks." 	 The answer is to
maintain a dynamic resource management approach that
aseures that the lowest priority items are the ones
slipped, and the ones that "fall between the cracks"
are among those that would have been omitted in
less ambitious planning.
if	
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